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[rlrohrer]

UNDERSTANDING KENYA
by Garrett Jones

January 4, 2008

Garrett Jones is a senior fellow of FPRI. A 1993 graduate of
the U.S. Army War College, he served as a case officer with
the CIA in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. He retired
in 1997 and now lives in the northwestern United States.

While most Americans were preoccupied with the holidays,
Bowl games, and the Iowa caucus, Kenya had a presidential
election. As African elections go, it went off pretty well.
There were long lines, and a record number of people were
estimated to have voted. While there were some reported
problems--shortage of ballots, attempted intimidation, etc.-
-it worked well enough at the local level. Raw results
showed that the challenger Raila Odinga defeated the
incumbent Mwai Kibaki by about a million votes and that most
of Kibaki's cabinet members were voted out in the
accompanying parliamentary poll. So far so good.

Somewhere between the local polling stations and the Kenyan
Electoral Commission in Nairobi, incumbent president Kibaki
simply stole the election and had himself declared winner.
It was no more subtle than that. The Election commission
hastily met and announced that Kibaki won. No public
tallying, poll watchers or transparency of any sort. Kibaki
quickly had himself sworn in for his second term as
president, and the opposition went mad. There have since
been a series of riots, killings and arsons, which have
largely paralyzed Kenyan society. The opposition shows no
signs of backing down, and Kibaki has indicated no interest
in negotiating about the results.

This is the second presidential election since former
president Daniel Arap Moi (a member of the Kalenjin tribe, a
small tribe distantly associated with the Maasai) was forced
to retire in 2002 and give up single-party rule after 24
years in office. Moi had taken over the office as vice
president after the first post-colonial president, Jomo
Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, died in office. At the time Moi took
office, he was considered a placeholder until the Lou and
Kikuyu tribes could sort out which of their many political
leaders would be next to inherit the presidency. Moi turned
out to be a clever political operator, and through
manipulating tribal hatred and a liberal use of bribery,
stayed in office long after anyone thought possible. He
would probably still be in office, but the end of the Cold
War had brought demands by the Western aid donors for a fair
multiparty election, which Moi had no chance of winning.

The first true multi-party election was held in 2002. Kibaki
(a Kikuyu, the largest tribe in Kenya, centered in the Mt.
Kenya-Nairobi area), with Odinga (a Luo, second largest
tribe, found in western Kenya), combined into a coalition
which easily won both the presidential and parliamentary
elections. Part of the pre-election platform was an
agreement that Odinga and Kibaki would share power and that
a new constitution would be written providing more power to
the prime minister. (Under current Kenyan law, the prime
minister is largely a figurehead; the real power resides in
the presidency.) Once Kibaki was sworn into office in 2002,
he quickly disowned the pre-election accord and excluded
Odinga and members of the Luo tribe from any meaningful
positions of power. After removing Odinga as political
rival, Kibaki then continued to obstruct the rewrite of the
Constitution until the effort largely collapsed in confusion
and left him with the powers of the presidency intact.

Kibaki's performance in office has been abysmal. Corruption
has spiraled out of control during his tenure, provoking
complaints and threats from normally complacent donor
countries. (Kenyan political wags note that several of Moi's
more notorious "bagmen" have been "rehabilitated' under the
Kibaki administration, prompting some of them to wonder if
they are being brought back for their experience in
"advanced thieving".) The protests about corruption have
been led by Great Britain, with the U.S. following along
with supporting statements about the need for reform. But no
stern measures have been taken by any of the major donor
nations, and even the current farce of a "free election" has
not resulted in a denunciation, only an expression of
concern about the results. (The U.S. State Department had
congratulated Kibaki on "his victory" early on, only to
quickly back off after knowledgeable observers pointed out
that they might want to rethink that position.)

Kenya is usually described by the media as a strategic ally,
whose stability is vital to U.S. interests. That is pretty
much overblown hype. Kenya is useful but hardly
irreplaceable to U.S. policy. It has always had "good press"
in the U.S. for two rather odd reasons, one romantic the
other logistic. The romantic stems from the many Americans
who have been to Kenya. As a result, it is the only African
country with which they have any familiarity. Kenyans are a
friendly, wonderful people, and the countryside itself is
every bit as stunning as the movies portray it, and then
some. Americans go there on vacation and have one of the
most memorable and exciting experiences of their lives. They
fall in love with the very small and largely orchestrated
part of Kenya they are shown by their safari guides. I will
refrain from cataloging the number of otherwise hardheaded
Americans I have seen come to Kenya and then lose themselves
in the romance of "Out of Africa". The place is magic.

The logistical cause is that living in Nairobi, until now,
is a lot nicer than living in Kampala, Dar as Salaam, or any
other city in East Africa you care to name. As a result,
NGOs, charities and U.S. government agencies have located
large numbers of their staff in Kenya and use Nairobi as a
regional base. (This diplomatic/NGO economic activity is a
significant part of the Kenyan GDP.) Since the various aid
and NGO organizations are the best-known voices about
Africa, at least in the U.S. political context, their
opinions carry weight. Aid organizations are no different
from any other organizations. If large parts of your
infrastructure are invested in a place; the country suddenly
becomes important, nay vital. Unfortunately, these groups
are unlikely to risk their "good standing" with the Kenyan
government by backing any serious international moves to
correct the situation. It seems that those on the side of
the angels may have clay feet this year.

Kenya is a useful ally in Africa and a country with which
the U.S. should cultivate good relations, but it is neither
strategically important nor vital to U.S. interests. Other
East African countries can replace the ports and airfields
currently available to the U.S. military in Kenya. Kenya has
been a useful listening post for events in Somalia, but this
role can also be picked up elsewhere. U.S. economic activity
in Kenya is minor. The main foreign economic players in
Kenya are the United Kingdom and India. So far, the UK has
been the only donor country pushing for some sort of power
sharing compromise, although the European Union seems to be
headed that way. The U.S. has badly fumbled its response to
the situation and has confused the average Kenyan. It is
hard to puzzle out what U.S. policy is at this point, even
for me, and I follow the matter closely.

Who is doing the killing? Most of the deaths and arsons
until now are a result of inter-tribal fighting--the
majority tribe in an area setting on the minority tribe; Luo
in Kikuyu areas and Kikuyu in Luo areas. Americans simply do
not seem to understand what tribalism means in an African
context. Tribalism is racism just like the Klu Klux Klan
was. Kikuyu "know" the Luo are stupid and dirty, and since
they are not "cut' (the males circumcised in their early
teens), they are not really people. The Luo "know" the
Kikuyu are greedy and treacherous. And it goes on, with each
tribe "knowing" the subhuman traits of its neighbors.
Ascendancy in political office has always been seen in a
tribal sense in Kenya and is viewed as the chance for the
tribe in office to "eat" (cronyism, patronage, bribery and
corruption). The Kikuyu have had their turn under Kenyatta
and Kibaki, and the Luo now believe it is their turn to
"eat". This said, it is also true that the sort of confusion
Kenya has seen recently brings out the thieves and
opportunists in any country. Looting and private score-
settling are certainly happening--though sorting the
thievery out from genuine outrage over a stolen election and
a sense of entitlement betrayed is going to be a matter for
history.

What is going to happen next? The two protagonists do not
make for hopeful predictions. Odinga leads the Orange
Democratic Movement (ODM), an alliance of the Luo and other
minority tribes. In fact, it is a one-man show. Odinga acts
as the glue holding together the many factions that want to
boot the Kikuyu from power. Odinga sees himself as both a
politician and a revolutionary. (He was educated in East
Germany and named his son after Fidel Castro.) In the past,
Odinga has allegedly been associated with several half-baked
coup plans, including the 1982 Air Force revolt, though
there has never been any concrete proof of his involvement.
Odinga has ample reason to distrust Kibaki and his advisers
simply because they have repeatedly lied to him in the past.
Unfortunately, taking Odinga's claims to court is simply a
non-starter in Kenya. While I would not want to say that any
Kenyan judge could be bought, they can certainly be rented
for very reasonable rates. Kibaki, with the resources of the
presidency, has a much bigger wallet than Odinga.

For Kibaki, this is the last hurrah. He has spent his adult
life striving for the presidency and is unlikely to
relinquish his second term to an upstart Luo like Odinga, no
matter how much the Western aid donors or the Kenyan public
howls. He has corrupt but capable advisers (the "Mt. Kenya
Mafia") around him and a firm grip, at least so far, on all
the levers of power. There is some question about Kibaki's
health, both mental and physical. He has had some health
scares in the past and has been strangely uncommunicative to
all parties since the election. At this distance, it is
impossible to tell whether this isolation is a problem of
some sort or a political tactic. Any compromise Kibaki would
entertain will almost certainly be unacceptable to Odinga,
and at the moment, Kibaki has stated there will be no
discussion with anyone until the protests stop. Odinga is
unlikely to abandon his only weapon, street protest, and
Kibaki is not going to make a gracious exit for the sake of
the nation.

With meaningful negotiations unlikely and outside diplomatic
actors either unwilling or unable to shift Kibaki, the
current violence can only continue. Odinga will not back
down and Kibaki will not give in. The violence will not stop
until Kibaki either jails Odinga or drives him into exile.
(Odinga had several bouts of exile during Moi's presidency,
and he was singularly ineffectual as an outside agitator.)
But while Odinga's arrest or exile would temporarily calm
the situation, in the end it would simply set the stage for
escalating inter-tribal violence.

There is some precedent in Kenyan politics for having your
political opponents "poisoned while trying to escape"; such
an act would set off even worse violence. We can hope
something better will happen; the country certainly deserves
better.


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NAMES, PLACES, AND PEOPLE TO KNOW

Tribal breakdown by candidate (not all-inclusive--there are
many minor tribes in Kenya):

Kibaki - Kikuyu, Meru, Kamba

Odinga - Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, Coast Swahili/Muslim

Eldoret - town in western Kenya located in the Rift Valley,
majority population Kalenjin and associated tribes, site of
the reported church burning with Kikuyu victims.

Kisumu - western Kenya Luo heartland

Mombassa - coastal port city, majority Swahili/ Muslim
population, site of Swahili on Kikuyu violence.

Mt. Kenya - central Kenya, Kikuyu heartland.

Nairobi - capital and a Kikuyu city, slums around the city
are a mix of all tribes now engaged in a free-for all.

Kenyan Police:

Administrative Police - Traffic cops, poorly trained
and equipped. Uniform is white shirt and blue trousers.

Regular Police - light blue shirt, dark blue pants,
day-to-day criminal police, poorly equipped and led, poorly
respected because of their constant extortion of bribes from
the average Kenyan. Probably responsible for most of the
deaths at government hands up to this point. They present
the real possibility of committing panic-induced killings
when confronted by violent protests. The Kenyan police
consider firing live rounds over the heads of protesters a
normal and accepted practice.

General Service Unit (GSU) - well equipped and trained,
generally well led. Camouflage uniform with red beret. The
"hard boys" of the Kenyan police. They have a well-deserved
reputation for cracking heads. They seem to operate on the
unofficial directive "If you makes us get off the trucks,
someone is going to the hospital". Despite this, they have
excellent fire discipline and experience in handling civil
disturbances. Despite their fearsome reputation, they have
earned grudging respect by the civilian population. The GSU
does not engage in the petty bribery of the average Kenyan
police officer. The Kenyans might expect to get their heads
cracked by the GSU, but they know they will not be robbed.
The GSU also has a history as an equal opportunity riot
force. They are recruited across tribal lines and will
launch a baton charge at any tribe or socio-economic group
with equal enthusiasm.

Kenyan Army - Apart from some elite units, which are as good
as any in Africa, most of the Army is suitable only for
bands and parades. The Kenyan army has no equipment or
training to handle civil disturbances. If the Kenyan Army is
deployed to the streets in anything other than a support
role to the GSU, there is a real possibility of a disaster
in the making.

National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) - The
external/internal intelligence agency of the Kenyan
government, highly trained by African standards. During the
Moi presidency, they were highly politicized and employed in
brutally crushing political dissent. Reforms under Kibaki
seem to have eliminated most abusive practices. They have
not been heard from in this crisis, though one can assume
they are maintaining a watching brief and have a good
knowledge of Odinga's activities.

Jomo Kenyatta - the first postcolonial president of Kenya, a
Kikuyu. Died in office in 1978.

Jaramogi Odinga Odinga (Double O) - First post-colonial vice
president and father of Raila Odinga. Luo leading politician
and patriarch until his death in 1994.

Nairobi slums (Mathare, Kibera, and Kamakunja) - These
shantytowns ring Nairobi and are of mixed tribal
populations. They are without exception dirt poor, lacking
any infrastructure such as sewer or water supplies. They are
flashpoints for violence and at the height of tensions are
"no-go" areas even for the GSU.

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Contact FPRI for permission to repost it at another website.

Alan and I spoke on 1/8/08 and we have his permission to post.
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